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I. Introduction 
Interest parity in international financial markets exists 
when the interest rate differential between two counties is 
exactly offset by the forward exchange premium/discount. If at 
any moment the interest parity condition is not satisfied, 
traders can execute covered interest arbitrage. Covered interest 
arbitrage entails a series of four transactions in the currency 
and securities markets which results in a practically riskless 
profit. Although traditional economic theory predicts that the 
opportunities will be wiped out as individuals take advantage of 
the situation, covered interest. arbitrage margins (ClAMs) have 
been observed to exist over extended periods of time. 
Previous research in the area has attempted to rectify the 
discrepancy by;identifying factors outside the basic arbitrage 
equation which work to negate profit opportunities. The most 
dominant of such factors in the literature have been transactions 
costs, partly because they are quantifiable. Other factors, such 
as political/financial-center risk, timing problems, and 
imperfect elasticities of demand and supply have been explored as 
well, but are more difficult to pin down empirically. 
My research is an attempt to determine whether transactions 
costs are enough to explain away ClAMs, or if 
political/financial-center risk also plays an important role. 
The focus is on the time period summer/fall 1992 when the 
European Monetary System crisis occurred, bringing along with it 
heavy speculation, volatility, and intervention in the currency 
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markets. A higher political/financial-center risk for London is 
hypothesized to exist during this time period, creating the 
possibility of margins that cannot be explained away by simple 
transactions costs alone, and thus presenting an ideal time for 
further study. 
Overall, the results of the research suggest that 
transactions costs may indeed be enough to explain away margins 
between developed financial centers such as London and New York, 
but are inconclusive until better data is obtained. 
II. Basic Theory 
If interest parity does not hold, covered interest arbitrage 
margins appear and riskless arbitrage is possible. For example, 
if a negative margin is found to exist between New York and 
London, a trader may execute the following set of transactions 
for a profit: 
1) borrow dollars on the u.s. market at a lower rate of 
interest, 
2) exchange dollars for British pounds on the spot market, 
3) purchase higher yield British securities, and 
4) enter a forward contract of corresponding maturity to bUy 
back dollars. 
This series of transactions is in itself riskless in that the 
exchange rate exposure has been nUllified, thus guaranteeing a 
profit at maturity regardless of changes in exchange rates. 
Simple supply and demand reasoning leads us to believe that 
the profit opportunity should be short-lived. As traders engage 
in the transactions, pressure is applied on each component in 
such a way that the interest differential and forward 
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premium/discount produce parity. For example, the purchase of 
pounds and sale of dollars on the spot market causes the dollar 
exchange rate to weaken. It will consequently cost individuals 
more to purchase pounds, adding to costs and reducing profit. 
Similarly, an increased flow of funds to London and the 
subsequent purchase of securities causes the interest rate on 
these securities to fall, also decreasing the amount of profit 
generated by arbitrage. The same reasoning applies for the u.S. 
interest rates as well as the forward exchange rate. These sorts 
of changes continue until interest parity is brought about and 
investors are indifferent to covered interest arbitrage. 
What this then suggests is that if people do act rationally 
i.e. by taking advantage of profit opportunities, ClAMs should 
not be observed. It is an established fact, however, that margins 
exist in real life. For example, Grubel calculated margins for 
the time period of 1956 to 1960 and found them to deviate from 
parity at a range between negative two and five percent 
annualized (pg. 80). More recent sources such as Salvatore (pg. 
397) and Rivera-Batiz (pg. 109) also attest to the fact that 
ClAMs exist. 
III. Accounting for Observed Margins 
A. Market Inefficiency 
Early research in the area sought to fjndexplanations for 
the ClAMs in the markets themselves. It was reasoned that the 
markets were not sUfficiently efficient so as to act in a way 
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that could eliminate ClAMs. This was in the time of the gold 
standard and fixed exchange rates. Although these may have been 
valid factors forty years ago in relatively under-developed 
markets, today's financial markets are vastly different. Global 
communications and computerized trading ensure almost 
instantaneous access to the markets. Similarly, the international 
flow of capital has been deregulated to such an extent that short 
term funds are free to move between major financial centers 
without obstacles. Thus, the roots of the persistence of ClAMs 
are unlikely to be found in inefficient markets and obstacles to 
transacting. 1 
There exist two other major views or explanations of ClAMs, 
each of which will be considered separately in this section. One 
of them has been extensively explored by Frenkel and Levich, the 
other by Grubel. I do not wish to suggest that either explanation 
"belongs" or is solely represented by these people. Rather, f6r 
the sake of simplicity and convenience, the theory of 
transactions costs will be mainly associated with Frenkel and 
Levich while that of additional risks with Grubel. 
B. Transactions costs and the Neutral Band 
Frenkel and Levich did not invent the concept of 
1 The subsequent use of the concept of efficiency in this 
paper is more generalized than the strict definition found in 
economics/finance. By claiming that markets are efficient it is 
simply meant that when faced with possible profit opportunities, 
people act rationally. 
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transactions costs as they were already considered in the 
original piece on covered interest arbitrage, Keynes' A Tract on 
Monetary Reform, but the majority of modern literature dealing 
with transactions costs has been written by Frenkel and Levich. 
The concept of transactions costs stems from the fact that 
external costs not explicit in the covered interest arbitrage 
formula itself exist. These costs include such things as 
brokerage fees, time costs, subscription costs, and the costs of 
being informed. If in sum these expenses are greater than the 
possible profit derived from interest arbitrage, no rational 
investor will execute the arbitrage. Thus, small margins could 
exist for extended periods of time as almost an illusion--exact 
interest parity does not hold, but in effect interest arbitrage 
is not profitable. 
The interest parity line can be seen in graphical form in 
Figure 1 (see end of paper for all Figures). Any point not lying 
on this 45 degree line does not satisfy the parity condition, 
i.e. the interest differential is not exactly offset by the 
discount/premium on foreign exchange. The existence of 
transactions costs can be seen to create a neutral band around 
the interest parity line (Figure 2). Any point contained within 
this band would not represent a profit opportunity as the costs 
of transacting would outweigh the potential returns. Such points 
are considered to attest to the existence of functional interest 
parity, whereas if points exist outside the neutral band, the 
interest parity condition is not satisfied. Keynes believed that 
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the yield advantage had to be in excess of 0.5% annualized to 
induce any flows. Subsequent empirical estimates have placed the 
number between 0.18% (Branson 1968) and 0.25% (Holmes and 
Schott). 
In functional notation, we can define the neutral band as: 
where id~= domestic interest rate 
i fer= foreign interest rate 
sp= spot exchange rate 
fw= f~rward exchange rate 
t~ and t sp= transactions costs in currency markets 
td~ and t fer= transactions costs in securities markets. 
This inequality basically states that for interest parity to hold 
in effect, the sum of the transactions costs in currencies and 
securities markets must be greater than or equal to the profit 
margin derivable from interest arbitrage. 
c. outside Risks 
Grubel's work takes a distinctly different approach to 
solving the dilemma. Modern Portfolio theory, as developed by 
Tobin, forms the backbone of his explanation for why ClAMs exist. 
The basic premise is that the demand for any security is a 
function of the expected return and risk associated with holding 
it. Initially, if there is a slight earnings advantage in favor 
of a foreign security the flow of funds will be quick to exploit 
it. However, it takes a higher and higher expected return to 
induce more funds because of the risk associated with holding too 
•
 
much of one asset. Thus, the supply of arbitrage funds is not 
perfectly elastic (Grubel 15-18). 
In times of relative calm in international markets, this 
imperfection is assumed not to cause ClAMs. But, during times of 
heavy speculation and volatility, interest parity may be 
disrupted. Activity in the forward exchange markets is the chief 
source of the disruption. As evidence for his view Grubel cites 
the Suez Canal crisis of 1957 when heavy speculation against the 
pound existed, and ClAMs were observed to exist for a long 
period. 
A non-technical explication of the outside risks associated 
with covered interest arbitrage may help shed some more light on 
the matter. Covered interest arbitrage is riskless only in the 
sense that exchange rate risk has been nUllified, not in the 
sense that there are absolutely no other risks involved with it. 
Two basic considerations are behind the portfolio approach. 
First, the fact that funds are tied up for a definite amount of 
time adds risk to covered interest arbitrage that is not inherent 
in the transactions themselves. Anytime funds are tied up, a 
certain amount of risk is added--for example, opportunities with 
higher returns could arise, or the money might be needed 
elsewhere. Second, the higher the proportion of portfolio 
investments held in any single asset is, the less diversification 
there is, and clearly this is also a risk consideration. These 
two outside risks exist regardless of the time period under 
consideration. They are almost impossible to quantify, and thus 
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cannot be explored in the empirical section explicitly. There 
exists a third type of outside risk, however, that presents an 
opportunity for empirical investigation. 
The third outside risk, which is explored by Frenkel and 
Levich in their empirical studies and hinted at by Grubel as 
well, is that of political/financial-center risk. International 
investments always carry with them an additional risk 
consideration which stems from the fact that foreign governments 
are sovereign (Rivera-Batiz pg. 115). In other words, a u.s. 
investor has no guarantee that his funds are safe when invested 
abroad. Each financial center carries with it a perceived amount 
of risk which investors must be compensated for in terms of 
higher returns if they are to invest there. Obviously, the 
political and financial stability of the United states allows it 
to offer much lower rates than say Hungary as far as foreign 
investors are concerned. 
The difference in stable times between London and New York 
may be minimal, but in volatile times this is not necessarily so. 
If either were to experience instability, it would consequently 
be associated with a higher political/financial-center risk. Thus 
in this sense covered interest arbitrage is not entirely risk­
free either. There clearly exist outside risks--capital controls, 
financial system collapse, repatriation problems etc.--that 
become more likely in times of turbulence. 
ThUS, what we gather from this discussion is that it is 
possible that outside risks can keep investors from taking 
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advantage of covered interest arbitrage and cause margins to 
persist, especially in volatile and turbulent times. 
IV. Description of Time Period 
In this study I wish to examine the role these two 
explanations (transactions cost and outside risk) played in 
determining interest parity during the time of the European 
Monetary crisis of 1992. The summer and fall of 1992 were 
characterized by a tremendous amount of turbulence in Europe that 
derived from both economic and political spheres. 
German interest rates were,kept high by the Bundesbank in an 
effort to keep inflationary pressures resulting from re­
unification in check2 • The other members of the European Exchange 
Rate Mechanism (ERM) were struggling with their own economic 
recoveries and thus would have wished to lower interest rates as 
a stimulus. Yet the ERM required that exchange rates of member 
countries fluctuate within a narrow band, and lower interest 
rates compared to Germany would have caused this band to be 
broken by many currencies. Simultaneously, there existed 
political friction over the ratification of the Maastricht 
Treaty. All these factors resulted in volatility, speculation, 
and turbulence. The pressure on the British pound finally proved 
too great to quell. Despite heavy intervention on its behalf, the 
pound was set to float as Britain disjoined, the ERM indefinitely 
2 The events of 1992 are from Bank of England Quarterly 
Bulletin, November 1992. 
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on September 16, 1992. 
Since during this same period the united States enjoyed a 
period of calm, London is assumed to have a higher 
political/financial-center risk associated with it. Tying 
together our previous discourse, we reach the following synopsis. 
If political/financial-center risk does in fact lead to larger 
and more persistent ClAMs, this should definitely be evident 
during our period of study because of its volatile nature. Yet if 
transactions costs do an adequate job of accounting for the 
margins between New York and London even in summer/fall of 1992, 
they probably constitute a satisfactory explanation in normal 
times as well. 
v. Data 
The calculation of covered interest arbitrage margins and 
transactions costs require data on domestic and foreign interest 
rates, spot and forward exchange rates, and bid and ask prices on 
securities. The table on the following page indicates exactly how 
each variable is defined. 
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-Interest Rates- Traditional Pair of Securities: 
id~ u.s. 90-day Treasury-Bill rate. 
it:or U.K. 90-day Treasury-Bill rate. 
-Interest Rates- Non-Traditional Pair of Securities: 
id~ 90-day Eurodollar deposit rate in London. 
i~r U.K. 90-day Treasury-Bill rate. 
-Foreign Exchange Rates: 
sp spot price of pounds per dollar. 
fw Forward price of pounds per dollar. 
US/OM spot price of dollars in terms of marks. 
OM/UK spot price of marks in terms of pounds. 
US/UK spot price of dollars in terms of pounds. 
-Bid-Ask Prices: 
Bid Price a dealer paid for a U.S. or U.K. 90-day 
Treasury-Bill at purchase. 
Ask Price the investor must pay to the dealer for 
the U.S. or U.K. 90-day Treasury-Bill. 
All data are weekly, from April 3 to December 24, 1992. The 
interest rates are Friday closing figures, collected from The 
Bank of Englanq Quarterly Bulletin; the rest are collected from 
the Friday editions of The Wall Street Journal. 
VI. Method of study 
A. The Point of using Two Sets of Securities 
The method by which we will accomplish a comparison of the 
opposing explanations involves using two pairs of securities, 
defined in section V as a traditional and non-traditional pair. 
Frenkel and Levich along with many other researchers have used 
this technique in their studies. 
A test for interest parity requires that the securities used 
to calculate ClAMs be as similar as possible. They should be of 
the same maturity and risk class to produce a completely valid 
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test. As the discussion on political/financial-center risk 
revealed, however, using the traditional pair of simple u.s. and 
U.K. Treasury Bills introduces some error because of the 
different risks associated with each. What we must do, then, is 
to remove this risk from the calculation of ClAMs. 
One way to accomplish this is to use a non-traditional 
securities pair in addition to the traditional one just 
mentioned. The non-traditional pair ideally consists of data 
collected at an external financial center, such as Paris, on the 
. 
rates the two currencies command. Since such data was not 
available for use in this study, we create a sUbstitute by basing 
both securities in London instead of some external center. It is 
hoped that this will serve the function of equalizing the 
political/financial-center risk adequately. 
comparing the ClAMs produced by the non-traditional as well 
as the traditional pair should then reveal that margins are 
smaller for non-traditional pair data. If transactions costs 
explain away all the margins produced by non-traditional pair 
data but only part of those associated with traditional pair 
data, we have evidence that political/financial-center risk is 
indeed an important consideration in establishing effective 
interest parity. If it should turn out, though, that the 
transactions costs are sufficient in encompassing all margins 
regardless of which data is used, then we could conclude that 
turbulence does not affect interest parity equilibrium much. 
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B. calculating the ClAMs 
The covered interest arbitrage margins are calculated using 
the first part of equation (l). The simple margins obtained with 
traditional pair data can be observed as an example from 
Figure 3. 
C. Estimating the Neutral Band 
As transactions costs are impossible to quantify directly, 
we must use a proxies for costs in the currency as well as 
securities markets. Again, these proxies are generally accepted 
and used in the literature concerning CIAMs, and thus will be 
adopted directly. 
The triangular arbitrage equation (2) provides an indirect 
method for measuring transactions costs. 
({US/DM)*{DM/UK»/{US/UK)=l (2) 
(for variable definitions, see section v.) 
It should not be possible for the holder of dollars to purchase 
pounds through German marks and end up with a different amount 
than if they go directly from dollars to pounds. Thus, in the 
absence of transactions costs, equation (2) must equal 1. When 
the costs of transacting in these markets is figured in, there 
will result a slight discrepancy in the condition. This 
discrepancy is our proxy for transactions costs in currency 
markets. 
In using equation (2) to reveal transactions costs, we are 
assuming that currency markets are efficient. It is very easy for 
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banks and traders to take advantage of any earnings potential 
derived from triangular arbitrage without even tying up funds. 
Thus, it is well within reason for the sake of the proxy to 
assume efficiency in nUllifying such opportunities. 
It is important that the data collected be as simultaneously 
recorded as possible. Exchange rates are in a continuous state of 
flux due to 24 hour trading, and clearly observations collected 
at different points in time cause unnecessary noise to be 
introduced. 
Since it was not possible to find all three cross rates 
required to compute equation (2)' in the forward exchange markets, 
it is assumed that transactions costs in forward markets are 
equal to those of the spot markets. In other words, in terms of 
equation (1), tf,,=t.p • 
To find a proxy for transactions costs in securities 
markets, the following is used: 
(Ask Price-Bid Price)/(Ask Price) (3) 
Dealers of securities require compensation, the difference 
between the bid and ask price, for their services and liquidity. 
Following the work of Demsetz (1968), Frenkel and Levich multiply 
the reSUlting figure by 2.5 to estimate total costs in securities 
markets. In this way the proxy is then extended to account for 
brokerage fees as well as the reward dealers command. The method 
will thus be used for our purposes as well •. 
Again, the spreads were not readily available for British 
securities, so we assume tdOlll=tror. 
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Figure 4 displays, among other things, the plot of a five 
week moving average of computed transactions costs. The moving 
average was utilized to smooth out excessive volatility from the 
measurement. Figure 5, on the other hand, shows the average 
transactions cost from over the entire period of study plotted as 
a neutral band around interest parity. Our average estimate of 
the transactions costs lands around 0.10%, which is a reasonable 
figure when compared to the findings of Branson, Holmes, and 
Schott. 
VIII.	 Results 
The overall results of computing ClAMs and transactions 
costs are seen in full in Figure 4 and Figure 5. 
From FigUre 4, the most immediately striking observation is 
that the margins generated by the non-traditional pair are 
without exception greater than the traditional pair margins. This 
runs contrary to expectations--recall that by equalizing 
political/financial-center risk it was expected that there exist 
less discrepancy between the interest rates and between London 
and New York. Thus, the margins were also expected to be smaller. 
What this leads us to believe, then, is that our non­
traditional pair data is not an adequate substitute for the ideal 
type mentioned earlier. It was hoped that basing both securities 
in London would do the job. However, the London T-Bill and 
Eurodollar deposits may not be completely comparable. There must 
exist some fundamental difference between these two types of 
15 
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interest rates that render them inadequate for the purpose of our 
study. If Eurodollar data in Paris for both currencies had been 
found, they would have most likely produced margins smaller than 
those of the traditional pair. 
The margins created by the traditional pair data are almost 
completely bound by transactions costs, i.e. the neutral band. 
This observation is made clear by looking at Figure 5. Here, the 
average total transactions costs through the entire time period 
is found and then plotted around interest parity, producing a 
neutral band. This neutral band contains within it all except one 
traditional pair ClAM. Recall that any point within the neutral 
band is not a profit opportunity as costs outweigh benefits. 
The only point in our sample time period that did not fall 
within the neutral band occurred on September 18, very close to 
the time Britain let its currency float. There are two possible 
ways of interpreting this outline. First, it could be that a real 
ClAM, and thus an unexploited profit opportunity, existed at this 
time. In fact, a profit opportunity could have persisted for 
nearly two weeks around September 18 and we would not know about 
it because of the sparsity of observations. Thus it could be that 
the volatility surrounding Britain's exit from the ERM did really 
cause margins, giving support for Grubel's theory. 
However, the September 18 point could merely reflect timing 
problems in the data. The exchange rates moved quickly during 
this period and the different measures that go into calculating 
ClAMs are not collected at exactly the same point in time. Thus, 
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additional noise created by the moves could be causing an 
inflated margin. The margin observed could then be just a result 
of measurement imperfections. Until more condensed (for example 
daily) data are found and tested to reduce the timing problem, it 
cannot be claimed with certainty that transactions costs negated 
all profit opportunities for the period of stUdy. 
IX. Conclusions 
The major weakness of this study was the quality of data and 
the lack of true external center data. If we had obtained say 
daily observations, it would have been much easier to make a 
clear judgement on what the case of September 18 really 
represents. Also, real external center data for the non­
traditional pair would have aided in exploring 
political/financial-center risk with more clarity. 
still, the results discussed above were successful in 
showing that for most of the time, transactions costs are 
sufficient in explaining away margins. Regardless of the one 
anomaly, the results do tend to lead us toward concluding that 
interest parity is maintained between London and New York largely 
by transactions costs alone, and that political/financial-center 
risk considerations are of secondary importance. This is not to 
say that the theory presented by Grubel is not applicable and 
should be abandoned, but that transactions costs clearly proved 
to be the dominant force in establishing effective interest 
parity in our study. 
17 
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The fact that transactions costs appeared to do the job 
alone probably stems from the fact that both of the financial 
centers in question are known for their overall stability. Even 
though London was experiencing major turbulence, Britain is still 
an economically strong and politically stable investment site. 
Thus investors are less likely to respond negatively to adverse 
news because they have assurances of safety based on the 
historical track record of London. 
Thus it could be that the political/financial-center risk 
consideration is of much greater importance when considering 
other financial centers. Were we to consider covered interest 
arbitrage between centers like New York and Kuala Lumpur or 
London and Prague, political/financial-center risk might assert 
itself as being of major importance in establishing interest 
parity because of the differential in risk class between the 
centers in question. This possibility presents an interesting' 
area, for further research. 
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